Week 108

Note: Today’s Weekly Conclusion is Part 1 of my long-belated post-mortem of the Battle of Avdiivka, focusing on the military situation.

One month ago, the fortress-city of Avdiivka fell. It is worth asking three questions: what are the ramifications of its capture, why did it happen, and what does that say about the war as a whole?

Avdiivka’s position was ultimately a weak one. Partially surrounded by Russian advances and lying mere minutes away from Donetsk City, de facto capital of the Russian occupation, it has long been vulnerable. That it became Russia’s primary target after Bakhmut’s fall in mid-2023 is mostly down to those three factors: relative isolation, closeness to Donetsk, and status as a redoubt.

This isn’t to say that the city has no significance. It does, arguably more than Bakhmut. Though its primary economic value (the coke plant) is ruined, it is mildly elevated above the local terrain (though not commandingly so), and its possession of a large junction could make it a railhead for future Russian thrusts into western Donetsk Oblast. Moreover, as a fortress, it served to discourage and block those thrusts west, hampering Russian advances in that direction.

Still, the rewards for taking the city are rather paltry. Though the situation is tenuous, Ukrainian troops appear – at least for now – to have stabilized the frontline before the Russians could gain momentum, taking from them most of victory’s fruits. The change in territory was substantial relative to the previous twelve months, but hardly game-changing.

Instead, as at Bakhmut, Avdiivka’s primary significance is likely defined less by the city itself than by both sides’ decision to suffer substantial casualties in contesting it. The manpower and vehicles expended by the Russians in taking the city was enormous, especially in the first two months of fighting. And though they took far fewer casualties than the Russians (as is typical), Ukraine was forced to deploy some of its limited reserves while accepting the death and disabling of several thousand soldiers it might otherwise have saved for use later in the year.

Why did the city fall? Two reasons on the Russian side will be dispensed with first: a willingness to absorb enormous casualties and a preponderance of firepower. Of course, these are not new lessons. Russia has proven time and time again, in this war and others, that it can and will bury a target with bodies and explosives until it is taken. What differed about this battle was twofold: the quality of the bodies, and the type of explosives.

While perhaps not influential yet, the Russian army’s qualitative improvement is noticeable and notable. Russia actually began the battle with an (admittedly disastrous) armored assault before it resorted to its signature infantry-heavy “meat assaults.” While not immensely effective, these assaults were carried out by better-equipped and better-trained units, superior to the convicts employed in the past. Ukrainian forces retain their edge, but the gap has closed, if only marginally.

Supporting these assaults was the Russian air force, who – for the first time in the war – made extensive and persistent use of its newfound strength: the ability to lob huge numbers of long-range glide bombs at the only target large enough for them to hit, a city. While really only serving as another substitute for “dumb” artillery, history has proven that several hundred kilograms of high explosives can become quite eloquent when needed, and Avdiivka is certainly not the only city the Russians hope to capture this year.

But, while important, these are not the main reasons for Avdiivka’s fall. Next week’s Conclusion will focus on that reason, which can be summed up in one word: supply.