Day 680
Relevant Statistics
All vehicle losses are visually confirmed only and thus represent the lowest possibly figure (sourced from Oryx, here and here); they are updated to the nearest 25 daily. All personnel losses are estimates or projections and should be viewed as such; they are updated as new information becomes available.
Russia
Ukraine
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Russian forces in Ukraine have committed and continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied regions of Ukraine, in violation of international law and basic human decency. Russian crimes in Ukraine constitute genocide and ethnic cleansing, with Russia’s stated war aims including the elimination of Ukrainians as a separate country, language, culture, and people.
No especially notable atrocities reported today.
Overview
According to the United States, Russia has procured and already begun using ballistic missiles from North Korea, and is likely due to receive similar munitions from Iran sometime in the next several months.
Regional Military Updates
Note: MilitaryLand maps are fifteen days old, and will not be updated for an indeterminate length of time until replaced by another source.
Northern Theatre
Svatove Front
Limited action. Fighting reported around Synkivka. Fighting reported east of Kupyansk. Fighting reported southwest of Svatove. Russian attacks west of Kreminna made limited gains. Fighting reported south of Kreminna.
Bakhmut Front
Limited action. Fighting reported near Spirne. Fighting reported northwest of Bakhmut. Fighting reported around Klishchiivka. Fighting reported around Andriivka. Fighting reported around Kurdyumivka.
Southern Theatre
Donetsk Front
Significant action. The Russian Avdiivka Offensive is ongoing. Fighting reported southeast of Novokalynove. Fighting reported around Stepove. Fighting reported around the Avdiivka Coke Plant. Russian attacks northeast of Avdiivka made marginal gains. Fighting reported southeast of Avdiivka. Fighting reported south of Avdiivka. Fighting reported near Sieverne. Fighting reported around Pervomaiske. Fighting reported around Marinka. Fighting reported near Novomykhailivka.
Velyka Novosilka Front
Limited action. No offensive action reported.
Zaporizhzhia Front
Limited action. Fighting reported around Verbove. Fighting reported around Robotyne.
Kherson Front [Provisional]
Skirmishing continues to be reported along much of the left bank of the Dnieper River, most especially in and around Krynky.
Daily Conclusion
In order to maintain a clear perspective and keep myself honest at the outset of the war’s third year, today’s Daily Conclusion is a series of predictions indicating how I think the war will progress in 2024. These predictions are arranged from High to Low confidence, with a percentage indicating my ballpark level of confidence in the prediction.
I fully expect some (even most) of these to be wrong, and for numerous unanticipated things to occur – war is the most complex activity undertaken by humans with any regularity, and is highly contingent, making prediction extraordinarily difficult at the best of times.
High (95%)
1) The Russian Black Sea Fleet will remain largely confined to port, and will play little to no role in the conflict.
2) Russia will become increasingly reliant on Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian hardware, and will be unable to mobilize its own industrial base to the degree it requires.
3) Ukraine will maintain its amphibious operations along the Dnieper, but will not make progress beyond the first several kilometers of shoreline.
Moderate (75%)
1) Russian forces will capture Avdiivka sometime in the first half of 2024, but will not be able to turn this (likely Pyrrhic) tactical victory into operational or strategic gains, a la Bakhmut.
2) On a related note, Russian forces will not make any major territorial gains through 2024. The capture of any major frontline city (e.g. Kupyansk, Lyman, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Zaporizhzhia; debatably Velyka Novosilka, Huliaipole, or Orikhiv) or a successful and sustained crossing of any major geographic barrier (e.g. the Oskil and Dnieper Rivers) would invalidate this prediction.
3) The delivery of F-16 and relevant Western weaponry will allow Ukraine to level the playing field in the skies somewhat and permit more aggressive air and ground attack operations, but will not lead to air dominance or substantially alter the air war.
4) Western aid will expand in 2024 over previous years, with the United States and Europe successfully passing large aid spending bills.
Low (50%)
1) Ukrainian forces will launch a new counteroffensive sometime in the middle of the year along the Svatove Front.
2) Russian forces will make gains around Bakhmut, reversing previous Ukrainian advances in the area and moving closer to (but not capturing) Kostyantynivka to the west.
3) Ukrainian forces will make a sustained crossing of the Krasna River (that runs through Svatove and Kreminna) somewhere along its length.
