Day 642
Relevant Statistics
All vehicle losses are visually confirmed only and thus represent the lowest possibly figure (sourced from Oryx, here and here); they are updated to the nearest 25 daily. All personnel losses are estimates or projections and should be viewed as such; they are updated as new information becomes available.
Russia
Ukraine
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Russian forces in Ukraine have committed and continue to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied regions of Ukraine, in violation of international law and basic human decency. Russian crimes in Ukraine constitute genocide and ethnic cleansing, with Russia’s stated war aims including the elimination of Ukrainians as a separate country, language, culture, and people.
No especially notable atrocities reported today.
Overview
The United States Senate will bring President Biden’s national security funding request to the floor next week. The long-delayed bill consists of aid packages for several countries – roughly $61 billion for Ukraine, $14 billion for Israel, and $7 billion in aid for Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific – as well as $14 billion in border security funding.
The Russian government appears to be readying austerity programs aimed at lessening the burden of Russian provinces on the federal budget, indicating the strain that the war effort is continuing to place upon the Kremlin’s finances.
Swathes of southern Ukraine have suffered power outages, flooding, and loss of heat from what is reportedly the largest storm to strike the Black Sea in at least a century. Battlefield effects currently appear to be limited, though reduced drone and artillery usage has been reported in the Southern Theatre. At sea, Russian warships have been confined to port, and some undersea mines have likely broken free of their moorings and begun floating freely.
Western and Western-aligned countries’ exports of potential warmaking materials to the Central Asian republicans bordering Russia has spiked since the start of the invasion, indicating widespread sanctions evasion efforts running through these regions.
Ukrainian partisans wounded senior Russian Kharkiv occupation official Slisarenko, the latest in a string of attempted assassinations and sabotage carried out in the occupied territories.
Regional Military Updates
Note: MilitaryLand maps are five days old.
Northern Theatre
Svatove Front
Limited action. Fighting reported northeast of Kupyansk. Ukrainian counterattacks east of Kupyansk likely repelled. Russian attacks northwest of Svatove repelled. Russian attacks west of Kreminna repelled. Fighting reported southwest of Kreminna.
Bakhmut Front
Limited action. Russian attacks northwest of Bakhmut likely repelled. Russian attacks southwest of Bakhmut repelled. Russian attacks around Klishchiivka likely repelled. Russian attacks around Andriivka likely repelled.
Southern Theatre
Donetsk Front
Significant action. The Russian Avdiivka Offensive is ongoing. Russian attacks northwest of Horlivka repelled. Russian attacks southeast of Novokalynove repelled. Russian attacks around Stepove repelled. Fighting reported around the Avdiivka Coke Plant. Russian attacks southeast of Avdiivka possibly made significant gains; unclear. Russian attacks around Sieverne repelled. Russian attacks around Pervomaiske repelled. Russian attacks around Marinka repelled. Russian attacks near Novomykhailivka repelled.
Velyka Novosilka Front
Limited action. Russian attacks south of Velyka Novosilka possibly made gains; unclear. Russian attacks southwest of Velyka Novosilka possibly made gains; unclear.
Zaporizhzhia Front
Limited action. The Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive has culminated. Fighting reported around Verbove. Ukrainian counterattacks around Novoprokopivka made marginal gains.
Kherson Front [Provisional]
Skirmishing continues to be reported along much of the left bank of the Dnieper River, most especially in and around Krynky.
Daily Conclusion
Note: Today’s Daily Conclusion is the first of a very belated three-part post-mortem of the Ukrainian 2023 Counteroffensive, which is widely agreed to have culminated around the end of October. This part consists of a brief analysis of the Counteroffensive itself and its military effects.
After several months of fighting, Ukraine’s 2023 (initially Summer) Counteroffensive appears to have culminated, likely having reached its maximum territorial advance. With this, major Ukrainian offensive operations have probably come to an end until the spring of 2024, which leads to the question: why was the counteroffensive launched, what was it composed of, what did it accomplish, and what does the outcome mean going forwards?
Broadly speaking, the counteroffensive had one goal: sever the logistics network supporting Russian forces located in the Southern Theatre between Donetsk City and Kherson, namely by cutting the rail lines around Tokmak and Bilmak, which were located halfway between the frontline and the sea past the (nominally) three-layer Surovikin Line of defenses.
The attacks were composed of three parts: a diversionary attack conducted around Bakhmut aimed at distracting and delaying the redeployment of several relatively elite Russian formations; an attempted relief of and breakthrough south of the city of Velyka Novosilka; and another attempted breakthrough to the south of the city of Orikhiv.
The results of these attacks were mixed. At Velyka, Ukrainian forces made substantial initial gains before stalling following the liberation of Urozhaine, though they did manage to secure the city itself (which had previously been threatened). At Orikhiv, initial Ukrainian attacks met with heavy losses and were rapidly reconfigured to pursue a slower, more methodical approach that obtained much more favorable casualty ratios and led to the liberation of Robotyne, but which slowed progress to a crawl and – eventually – a halt.
Ultimately, none of these efforts saw much territorial success. Gains were limited to 10 kilometers at most, and while a smattering of villages – Staromaiorske, Klishchiivka, Robotyne – were liberated, no major city was retrieved. The counteroffensive’s goals were far from achieved, with the final minimum viable goal – Tokmak, south of Orikhiv – still well behind the frontlines.
The counteroffensive, in short, failed. But *why* did it fail? The reasons are many and much is unknown, but a few issues are likely key.
First up are “hard” concerns like materiel shortages. “Shell hunger” has plagued Ukrainian units, who are able to fire less frequently and in smaller volumes than the Russians (who have far more air power to boot). The same applies to vehicles: though it has often been mocked for reactivating 1950s and 1960s equipment, Russia’s enormous Soviet stockpile is a massive benefit, allowing it to replace losses and equip new units much more heavily than Ukraine can. The slow and small delivery of badly needed Western aid – which will be the topic of Part 2 – has only worsened this gap.
Second are “soft” concerns centered around training and command. Spearheading Ukraine’s attacks at Velyka and Orikhiv were not battle-hardened veterans like the 92nd or 93rd Brigades, but newly-raised formations created on relatively rushed training schedules equipped with unfamiliar Western vehicles. Perhaps more importantly, the issue of “Soviet-style” officers – while certainly more common in the Russian Army – continues to plague Ukraine, with many complaints being made (sometimes publicly) against some officers, most notably Colonel General Syrskyi (head of the Ukrainian Army and commander of troops in the Northern Theatre). The inadequacy of Western training regimens – which reportedly emphasize a kind of warfare the Ukrainians cannot emulate and fails to take battlefield lessons from Ukraine into account – has also been criticized.
As the war of maneuver failed to achieve its objectives, the Ukrainian 2023 Counteroffensive and the ongoing Russian Avdiivka Offensive have made clear that the war has entered an attritional/positional phase – something that will be explored further in Part 2.
